Abstract. The paper cryptanalyses a new public key cryptosystem that has been recently proposed by Paeng, Ha, Kim, Chee and Park [5] . The scheme works on finite non-abelian groups. We focus on the group SL(2, Z Zp) × θ Z Zp which was discussed in [5] extensively.
Introduction
In [5] Paeng, Ha, Kim, Chee and Park presented a new public key encryption scheme based on the difficulty of the discrete log problem in the inner automorphism group of a non-abelian group G. This scheme was later called MOR cryptosystem [6] . As underlying group the authors propose the semi-direct product group SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p and discuss the resulting encryption scheme in detail. In [5] the authors do not give a formal proof of security for their system. They rather informally argue why an attacker should not be able to derive the secret key from the public key. Our analysis of the MOR system comprises several attacks that enable an attacker to determine the plaintext message under certain conditions without compromising the secret key.
The security of the MOR system is closely related to the hardness of the conjugacy problem in the underlying group G. Given x, y ∈ G the conjugacy problem is to find w ∈ G such that y = wxw −1 . In MOR using G = SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p the situation is slightly different. If m ∈ G is the plaintext message, ciphertexts are of the form C(m) = x ab mx −ab . The special situation of MOR using SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p , that we use in our attacks, is that the value x can easily be calculated from the public information (an element from the centralizer of x is already sufficient). We will see that in this case an attacker can collect valuable information about m in a ciphertext-only attack.
To increase the efficiency of their scheme in SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p the authors further propose some modifications to the original scheme. The first proposal is to use SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ {0} ∼ = SL(2, Z Z p ) instead of SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p . In its basic form the MOR system is a probabilistic encryption scheme: The sender has to choose a random encryption exponent for every message he wants to encrypt. For G = SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p the authors propose to fix the encryption exponent and use it for multiple encryptions. A randomised algorithm that maps plaintext messages in Z Z p to matrices in SL(2, Z Z p ) is used to get a probabilistic encryption scheme. We will present and discuss the drawbacks of these modifications.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we give a short summary of the MOR cryptosystem and its underlying constructions. For a more detailed description of the MOR system we refer to [5] . The sections 3 and 4 discuss the security of the MOR system. In section 3.1 we show that MOR using SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p is not harder than MOR using SL(2, Z Z p ). We further show that the parameter selection from [5] is not secure. In section 3.2 we present two ciphertext-only attacks for MOR using SL(2, Z Z p )× θ Z Z p that enable an attacker given one component of the plaintext to determine the whole plaintext message. In section 4 we investigate the security of the MOR cryptosystem when the encryption exponent is fixed. As we will see, MOR with fixed encryption exponent is vulnerable to known-plaintext attacks. Only one resp. two plaintext-ciphertext pairs are sufficient to decrypt all ciphertexts that were encrypted using the same exponent. In the appendix useful results about the matrix groups SL(2, Z Z p ) and GL(2, Z Z p ) are summarised.
Related Work:
The conjugacy problem is considered a hard problem in braid groups. There is no known polynomial time algorithm which solves the decisional or the computational conjugacy problem in braid groups. For a detailed discussion of cryptography on braid groups we refer to [1, 3, 4] . Other cryptosystems using the conjugation map on matrix groups have been published by Yamamura [7, 8] . The systems later were broken by Blackburn and Galbraith [2] .
Framework and Definitions

The MOR System
Definition 1 (Semi-direct Product Group). Let G and H be given groups and θ :
together with the multiplication map
The semi-direct product G × θ H is also a group. 
Definition 2 (The Mapping Inn). Let G be a group. Then the mapping
Inn : G → Aut(G) g → Inn(g) is given by Inn(g)(h) = ghg −1 .(G) of G is defined as Z(G) := {g ∈ G | xg = gx ∀x ∈ G}. The centralizer Z(g) of a group element g ∈ G is defined as Z(g) := {h ∈ G | hg = gh}. Note that Z(G) = g∈G Z(g).
Definition 4 (Conjugacy Problem
Definition 5 (Special Conjugacy Problem). For a given Inn(g) the special conjugacy problem is to find a group elementḡ ∈ G satisfying Inn(g) = Inn(ḡ).
The solution set for the special conjugacy problem is g · Z(G).
In GL(2, Z Z p ) the conjugacy problem is easy. To solve the special conjugacy problem in GL(2, Z Z p ) two pairs (A 1 , Inn(A 1 )) and (A 2 , Inn(A 2 )) with A 1 / ∈ Z(A 2 ) are needed (see appendix A.2 for details).
The MOR cryptosystem: MOR is an asymmetric cryptosystem with a random value a as secret and the two mappings Inn(g) and Inn(g a ) (given as {Inn(g)(γ i )} and {Inn(g a )(γ i )} for a generator set {γ i } of G) as corresponding public key.
The encryption process works as follows:
1. Alice expresses the plaintext m ∈ G as a product of the γ i .
Alice chooses an arbitrary b and computes
(Inn(g a )) b , i.e. {(Inn(g a )) b (γ i )}. 3. Alice computes E = Inn(g ab )(m) = (Inn(g a )) b (m). 4. Alice computes Φ = Inn(g) b , i.e. {Inn(g b )(γ i )}.
Alice sends (E, Φ).
Decryption Process:
1. Bob expresses E as a product of the γ i .
Bob computes
In [5] no formal proof of security is given for the MOR cryptosystem. The authors state that the security of the MOR cryptosystem relies on the discrete log problem in the inner automorphism group of G. They argue that even an adversary that is able to calculate discrete logs in G is not able to determine the secret exponent a since the conjugacy problem does not have a unique solution and if G has a center of appropriate size, the attacker gets a vast number of DLP instances and is not able to figure out the correct one.
MOR Using SL(2, Z Z
In [5] the authors propose to use the group
The two matrices T = 1 1 0 1 and
can be calculated efficiently (see [5] 
We present two simple but powerful attacks that can be carried out if g or any element of the centralizer of g is known to the attacker. Both attacks are ciphertext-only. The first attack uses the above mentioned properties of G = SL(2, Z Z p ), whereas the second may be used for arbitrary groups G where the conjugacy problem is easy.
Thus everyĝ = (x,ŷ) ∈ g · Z(G) can be written asĝ = (±xθ 1 (−z), y + z) for a z ∈ Z Z q andxθ 1 (ŷ) is of the form
It follows that the value xθ 1 (y) is (apart from its sign) invariant for all elements of g · Z(G).
The encryption function of MOR using
n . For MOR using SL(2, Z Z p )× θ Z Z p that means that an attacker is able to calculate ±xθ 1 (y) and (±xθ 1 (y)) a from the receiver's public key and (±xθ 1 (y)) b from the ciphertext.
Thus MOR using SL(2, Z Z p )× θ Z Z p is not harder than MOR using SL(2, Z Z p ). In particular, recovering the plaintext m in a ciphertext-only attack in MOR using SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p is not harder than the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in SL(2, Z Z p ).
In [5] the authors propose to choose g = (x, y) ∈ SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p satisfying xθ 1 (y) = A(I + cδ 12 )A −1 for some c ∈ Z Z p and A ∈ SL(2, Z Z p ) (where δ ij is the matrix whose entries are all zero except the (i, j)-entry which is 1). This is a really unfortunate choice since the authors themselves showed in [5] , remark 1, that the discrete log problem is easy for matrices of this special form which means that the secret key a can be calculated easily in this case. In fact, the value g = (x, y) ∈ G has to be chosen such that the discrete log problem is hard in the subgroup generated by xθ 1 (y).
In the following sections we will concentrate on MOR using SL(2, Z Z p ), but with the techniques presented in this section the described attacks can easily be applied to attack MOR using SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p also.
Ciphertext-Only Attacks with Known Centralizer Elements
In this section we present two ciphertext-only attacks on MOR using GL(2, Z Z p ) and MOR using SL(2, Z Z p ).
Our attacker is given a ciphertextM =
We assume that the attacker knows X or any element from the centralizer of X (Since the CP is easy in SL(2, Z Z p ), X can be computed given Inn(X) = {Inn(X)(γ i )} which is part of the receiver's public key.).
In our first attack we use the centralizer elementX ∈ Z(X) to transform the given ciphertextM to a ciphertextX
Using the invariance of the trace and the determinant under conjugation we get three equations in the components of M which enables us to derive the structure of the encrypted plaintext M . In particular, if one component of M is known, the whole plaintext matrix M can be reconstructed.
In the second attack the centralizer elementX ∈ Z(X) is used to calculate
Since the conjugacy problem is easy in GL(2, Z Z p ) one gets information about the structure of
This simple lemma will be very useful in the following sections:
GL(2, Z Z p ). Then tr(M ) = tr(M ).
Proof.
Attack 1:
Using the notation of the lemma we know that
e. a second linear equation for the desired values a, b, c, d.
Unfortunately, this trick only works once. If we do the same trick again with another centralizer elementX = xȳ wz ∈ Z(X) and set
we get a system of three linear equations:
We further know thatx =ẑ + 
where the functions f 1 , f 2 and f 3 are known.
Attack 2:
The aim of the second attack is to calculate the value X k · M .
By solving the conjugacy problem for the instance (X,X) one gets that
Unfortunately, performing this attack multiple times does not lead to more data about
and can further express s in terms of t.
Attacks when Exponents are Used Multiple Times
To make MOR using SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p more efficient the authors propose to fix the encryption exponent b and use it for multiple encryptions. The problem with that approach is that given one plaintext-ciphertext pair an attacker is able to calculate (xθ 1 (y)) ab which can be used to decrypt all ciphertexts that were encrypted using the same b 1 . In [5] In this section we will present two attacks that show that this padding technique is highly insecure. Both attacks are known plaintext attacks, i.e. the attacker knows pairs of ciphertext and corresponding plaintext. We show that an attacker that knows one resp. two plaintext-ciphertext pairs is able to decrypt all ciphertexts that are encrypted using the same encryption exponent b.
Our attacks work in SL(2, Z Z p ) as well as in GL(2, Z Z p ). Since GL(2, Z Z p ) is the more general case, we concentrate on GL(2, Z Z p ) (though the MOR system was origionally presented using SL(2, Z Z p )). In the first attack we assume that the attacker knows an element X ∈ Z(xθ 1 (y)), i.e. we are in the situation of section 3.2. In fact our attack is very similar to section 3.2 attack 1 which enables an attacker to determine the whole plaintext message if only one component is known. We will see that one plaintextciphertext pair is sufficient to solve the special conjugacy problem in GL(2, Z Z p ), i.e. to find a valueX ∈ GL(2, Z Z p ) with Inn(X) = Inn((xθ 1 (y)) ab ). In the second attack we assume that the attacker does not know any elements from the centralizer of xθ 1 (y). This might be the case when the mapping Inn(g) is represented in a different way. We show that in this case two plaintextciphertext pairs are sufficient to decrypt all future ciphertexts. This attack also demonstrates that the special conjugacy problem might also be easy in GL(2, Z Z p ) if pairs (A i , Inn(A i )) are given, but only parts of the matrices A i are known.
Attack with Known Centralizer
The attacker is given a message m ∈ Z Z p and the corresponding ciphertext
where M = m r s t ∈ GL(2, Z Z p ) with r, s, t ∈ R Z Z p . We further assume that the attacker knows an element X = x y w z ∈ Z(xθ 1 (y)) with X / ∈ Z(M ).
Since tr(M ) = tr(C 1 ) and det(M ) = det(C 1 ) the attacker can compute t and r · s. We now use the trick of section 3.2 attack 1:
−ab and tr(C 1 · X) = tr(M · X) = mx + rw + sy + tz. This is sufficient to calculate r and s. the two instances (M, C 1 ) and (X · M, X · C 1 ) are sufficient to solve the special conjugacy problem in GL(2, Z Z p ), i.e. to find a matrixX ∈ GL(2, Z Z p ) with Inn(xθ 1 (y)) = Inn(X) (see appendix A.2). This valueX can be used to decrypt all following ciphertexts that where encrypted using the same encryption exponent b.
Attack without Centralizer Elements
We now assume that the attacker is given two plaintext messages m 1 We now take a closer look at equationĀX = XA which is equivalent tō A = XAX −1 and describe it as a system of linear equations:
By adding the linear equations resulting fromBX = XB and simplifying the system by removing redundant equations we get:
ab B(xθ1(y)) −ab , 0) are given, we get this form by setting X = (xθ1(y)) ab .
Since we know the values r 1 ·r 2 and r 1 ·s 2 , we are able to express s 2 as s 2 = k·r 2 for a k ∈ Z Z p . Thus we get x = c 1 r 2 z, y = c 2 z and w = c 3 r 2 z where c 1 = 
and get the desired cleartext message by using the components of the ciphertext in combination with the precomputed constants c 1 , c 2 , c 3 and c 4 . In a similar way all other components of C can be calculated.
Conclusion
In section 3.1 we showed that xθ 1 (y) and (xθ 1 (y)) a can be extracted from Inn((x, y)) and Inn ((x, y) a ). Hence, for the security of MOR using G = SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p it is necessary to choose (x, y) ∈ G such that the discrete log problem is hard in the subgroup generated by (xθ 1 (y)). In particular, (x, y) must not be chosen such that xθ 1 (y) = A(I + cδ 12 )A −1 where c ∈ Z Z p and A ∈ SL(2, Z Z p ) as proposed in [5] .
With the ciphertext-only attacks from section 3.2 it is possible to determine the whole plaintext message if only one component is known. This attacks works in SL(2, Z Z p ) as well as in SL(2, Z Z p ) × θ Z Z p . To prevent this attack we recommend to use padding. Using the padding technique from [5] remark 4 (see section 4) and choosing the encryption exponent b randomly for every ciphertext is a good countermeasure against the presented attack.
The most critical point we discussed is fixing the encryption exponent b and using it for multiple encryptions. Without padding the resulting system is vulnerable to known plaintext attacks. If one plaintext-ciphertext pair is known all following ciphertexts can be decrypted. In section 4 we showed that the padding technique from [5] does not make the system more secure. It is an open question whether the MOR system (with fixed exponent) can be made secure by using an appropriate padding technique.
If MOR is used with SL(2, Z Z p )× θ Z Z p , an appropriate padding technique and the encryption exponent is chosen uniformly and independently for every plaintext to be encrypted, the resulting system seems to offer a reasonable amount of security (though there still is no formal proof). On the other hand calculating Inn(g b ) and Inn(g ab ) from Inn(g) and Inn(g a ) which then is necessary for every single encryption process is computationally very expensive which makes the system less efficient than RSA and ElGamal.
